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RAISING WALLS AGAINST OVERLAPPING RIGHTS:
PREEMPTION AND THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
Rebecca Tushnet*
INTRODUCTION
The right of publicity overlaps with trademark in its protections against
false endorsement, with copyright in its (supposed) justifications in incentivizing performances, and with traditional privacy and defamation torts in
protecting personal dignity and control over one’s own presentation of the
self. Yet the right of publicity has been used to extend plaintiffs’ control over
works and uses that don’t violate any of the rights with which it shares a
justification. This quicksilver nature is what makes the right of publicity so
dangerous.
The law of overlaps in the form of preemption cases might offer some
assistance in suggesting a purposive approach. Where the state-law right of
publicity has a similar purpose to that of copyright, it can conflict with that
right and be preempted by federal law. Where the right of publicity’s purpose is different, however, the relevant purpose or purposes furthered
should guide our analysis of the appropriate limits on the right. The fact that
plaintiffs have renamed their claims should not enable them to extend their
rights beyond the underlying justifications for those rights.
By comparing how preemption and First Amendment law have used purposive approaches to limit the right of publicity, we can see something about
how boundary work in intellectual property law (IP) is done—badly, usually,
with justifications that aren’t consistent or that assume that other regimes
work differently than they actually do. One improvement would be to
embrace categorical approaches, rather than unpredictable case-by-case balancing; both preemption and First Amendment doctrines can lend themselves to this approach. Another improvement would be to think of the First
Amendment as an intellectual property regime of its own, one with general
preemptive power. As Justice Brandeis said, the general rule is that ideas are
“free as the air to common use,” subject to changes worked by positive law,
© 2017 Rebecca Tushnet. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
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but the First Amendment can prevent positive law from putting ideas or facts
off-limits.1
I. THE EXPANSION

OF THE

RIGHT

OF

PUBLICITY

The stunning expansion of the right of publicity has been extensively
covered elsewhere.2 I will offer only two appalling recent examples: in 2015,
a district court allowed a right of publicity claim against a racing video game
to proceed.3 The theory of the case was that the game offered a visual representation of an actual racing track, including an image of a banner displaying
the trademark of Virag, an Italian flooring company.4 Virag is also the last
name of Mirco Virag, one of Virag’s owners, and the court accepted the allegation that the Virag trademark was a “personification” of Mirco Virag.5 As a
result, although the First Amendment precluded a claim against the video
game based on allegations of trademark infringement,6 a right of publicity
claim survived based on the game’s alleged use of Mirco Virag’s identity—
based on the same banner that triggered the First Amendment-barred confusion claim.7 Even in such cases of flat-out conflict between trademark’s and
the right of publicity’s respective First Amendment limits, courts have been
unwilling to limit the right of publicity.8
Similarly, a California trial court recently found that a plaintiff had
shown a probability of success on the merits of his claims that Facebook’s
practice of putting advertisements on webpages, including Facebook pages
set up to criticize the plaintiff, made a commercial use of the plaintiff’s name
and likeness and thus violated his statutory right of publicity and constituted
common-law misappropriation under California law.9 Truth and lack of neg1 Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
2 See, e.g., Stephen McKelvey et al., The Air Jordan Rules: Image Advertising Adds New
Dimension to Right of Publicity–First Amendment Tension, 26 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 945, 954–59 (2016).
3 Virag, S.R.L. v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am. LLC, No. 3:15-cv-01729, 2015 WL
5000102 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2015), appeal filed Virag, S.R.L. v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am.
LLC, No. 16-15137 (9th Cir. Jan. 29, 2016).
4 Id. at *2.
5 Id. at *1.
6 Id. at *8–13.
7 Id. at *7. Because this claim is identity-based, it does not depend on the Virag mark
being the same, orthographically, as Mirco Virag’s last name. On this theory, the use of
“Microsoft” implicates Bill Gates’s right of publicity, “Apple” implicates Steve Jobs, “Virgin”
implicates Richard Branson, etc.
8 Compare Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1242–47 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding a
video game protected by the First Amendment against a false endorsement claim based
solely on use of plaintiffs’ image and biographical data), with In re NCAA Student-Athlete
Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding a video game
unprotected by the First Amendment against a right of publicity claim based on the same
conduct).
9 Cross v. Facebook, Inc., No. CIV537384, 2016 WL 7785723 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 31,
2016).
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ativity in the portrayal aren’t defenses to a right of publicity claim, so the
right is far more expansive than plaintiff-friendly defamation rules the
Supreme Court invalidated long ago. Channeling the plaintiff’s claim into
the proper cause of action—preventing him from evading the well-justified
limits on defamation law10—is the obvious solution to the problem; instead,
the court approved an interpretation of the right of publicity that on its face
allows President Donald Trump to control every mention of his name in adsupported or for-profit media, which is to say almost all media outlets.11
One reason for this expansion is that, without a coherent justification
for the right of publicity, there are no obvious stopping points for its scope.
If the justification is merely about allowing a person control over unconsented uses of her image, then any uses or even reminders of her identity
would violate the right, subject at most to the external constraint of others’
First Amendment rights to engage in speech about the world.12 Following
this logic, courts have generally only limited the right based either on statutory exclusions, which need no theories behind them,13 or based on an often
cramped view of the First Amendment.14
There are comprehensive theories of the right of publicity that attempt
to give it an existence of its own, with boundaries defined by the nature of
the interest to be protected. Mark McKenna, for example, has offered a personhood-based account of the right of publicity.15 However, courts have generally not tried to provide any coherent theory behind the right. Some cases
offer a grab bag of possible interests that the right can serve, from personhood to incentive for performance to anti-false-association.16 Other cases
announce that the right of publicity is a property right, apparently a black
box into which one can inquire no further.17 I myself am skeptical that an
internal justification can be found that successfully distinguishes the right of
publicity from a trademark-type right against false endorsement, but the lack
10 See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1987).
11 Cross, 2016 WL 7785723, at *4.
12 See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993).
13 See, e.g., N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50–51 (McKinney 2016); Messenger ex rel. Messenger v. Gruner + Jahr Printing & Publ’g, 727 N.E.2d 549, 551–52 (N.Y. 2000) (per curiam)
(“New York does not recognize a common-law right of privacy . . . . [The New York statute]
is to be narrowly construed . . . .”).
14 Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001) (applying the
right of publicity to art prints and t-shirts bearing copies of the art prints).
15 Mark P. McKenna, The Right of Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition, 67 U. PITT. L.
REV. 225 (2005).
16 See, e.g., Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 967–68
(10th Cir. 1996).
17 Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013). Cardtoons, by contrast, labeled
the right of publicity “a form of property protection that allows people to profit from the
full commercial value of their identities,” 95 F.3d at 968, but then proceeded to examine
the specific justifications for the right and provided First Amendment protection for unauthorized uses when those justifications did not work, whether as a matter of fact applied to
the situation before the court or as a matter of First Amendment treatment of those justifications in other contexts, id. at 976.
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of judicial attention to the right’s justifications contributes to the lack of judicial attention to the right’s boundaries.
II. COPYRIGHT PREEMPTION

AS

BOUNDARY ENFORCER

Recent cases have highlighted the potential for using preemption theories to create a sort of definition of the right of publicity by subtraction:
where Congress has tried to achieve a particular aim, such as encouraging
the production of creative works, in a particular way, then states should not
be allowed to upset that balance by encouraging production in a different
way. Although better First Amendment treatment for the right of publicity
still remains an important need where a speaker is creating a new depiction
of a real person, preemption can define the boundaries of publicity rights
where the challenged use is based on an existing copyrighted work in which
the person voluntarily appeared.
A.

How Copyright Preemption Ought to Work in Right of Publicity Cases

The helpful role of preemption can be illustrated by Dryer v. National
Football League,18 which involved former football players’ right of publicity
claims based on the use of truthful, nondefamatory clips of them playing
games in films that were compilations of game footage and interviews.19
Offered a choice of First Amendment and preemption arguments with which
to dismiss the players’ claims, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
chose preemption. The challenged films depicted “significant games, seasons, and players in the NFL’s [National Football League’s] history” via compilations of game footage and interviews with players, coaches, and other
individuals involved in the game.20
The right of publicity here conflicted with the copyright owner’s right to
exploit its copyright, a not uncommon problem with expansive right of publicity claims.21 In Dryer, the players sought to prevent NFL Films from commercially exploiting films to which it owned the copyright.22 Copyright
preemption under section 301 of the Copyright Act—express preemption—
exists when (1) the plaintiff’s claim is based on a right equivalent to copyright, and (2) there is no “extra element” to distinguish the plaintiff’s claim
from copyright.23 Both parts of this test can be extremely fuzzy—it’s clear
that intent isn’t an extra element, for example, because an intent require18 814 F.3d 938 (8th Cir. 2016).
19 Id. at 941.
20 Id.
21 See, e.g., Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 197 F.3d 1284, 1286 (9th Cir. 1999) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting from denial of reh’g en banc); White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d
1512, 1514 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of reh’g en banc).
22 Dryer, 814 F.3d at 940.
23 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2012); see also Mark Lindsay, Complete Preemption and
Copyright: Toward a Successive Analysis, 20 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 43 (2012) (explaining the
“extra element” test).
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ment simply shrinks the set of instances of copying that can be actionable,
but when and whether common-law misappropriation claims are preempted
has remained the subject of judicial dithering across multiple circuits.24
In order to avoid copyright preemption, the former players in Dryer
argued that their performances in the filmed games were part of their identities, and thus that they weren’t making claims based on the copyrighted
works.25 The Court of Appeals rejected this argument, because modern copyright subject matter specifically encompasses fixed recordings of live sports
performances.26 NFL Films had permission to record those live performances, and had valid copyrights to its footage.27 Thus, the right of publicity
claims were based on a work within the subject matter of copyright.28
Dryer is exactly right—but it is worth noting that some courts have
rejected the very same argument when the plaintiffs’ claims were based on
still photographs rather than on moving images.29 In the conflicting cases,
courts accept the argument that the right of publicity protects a person’s face
or appearance in general, as some sort of Platonic ideal, and not the particular moment captured by a photo.30 My suspicion is that law’s general trouble
24 See generally Joseph P. Bauer, Addressing the Incoherency of the Preemption Provision of the
Copyright Act of 1976, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1, 71–80 (2007) (discussing multiple
difficulties courts have faced applying § 301 to right of publicity claims); Thomas F. Cotter
& Irina Y. Dmitrieva, Integrating the Right of Publicity with First Amendment and Copyright Preemption Analysis, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 165, 165 (2010) (arguing for conflict preemption
of right of publicity claims in cases involving noncommercial speech, absent specific exceptions); Jennifer E. Rothman, Copyright Preemption and the Right of Publicity, 36 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 199, 231 (2002) (arguing that conflict preemption should preclude a right of publicity claim when the depicted persons consented to the original work and the use does not
infringe copyright).
25 Dryer, 814 F.3d at 942.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 See also Ray v. ESPN, Inc., No. 13-1179-CV, 2014 WL 2766187, at *5 (W.D. Mo. Apr.
8, 2014) (finding preemption where the defendant “air[ed] video recordings depicting
[plaintiff] in a ‘work of authorship,’ which is plainly encompassed by copyright law”); Fleet
v. CBS, Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645, 647 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (finding preemption where
plaintiffs consented to appear in film but alleged that they were not paid and so their
performances were not authorized).
29 See, e.g., Toney v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 406 F.3d 905, 910 (7th Cir. 2005); Downing v.
Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1005 n.4 (9th Cir. 2001).
30 Courts rejecting § 301 preemption reason that regulation of the celebrity identity
captured in an image is not the same as regulation of the copyright-protected image itself.
However, the fact that a persona is not copyrightable does not end the inquiry under
§ 301. Congress intended to preclude states from giving copyright-like protection to matter within the general scope of copyright even if that matter was not copyrightable. See,
e.g., Montz v. Pilgrim Films & Television, Inc., 649 F.3d 975, 979–80 (9th Cir. 2011) (en
banc) (“[T]he scope of the subject matter of copyright law is broader than the protections
it affords. . . . For preemption purposes, ideas and concepts that are fixed in a tangible
medium fall within the scope of copyright . . . despite the exclusion of fixed ideas from the
scope of actual federal copyright protection.”); Toney, 406 F.3d at 910–11 (“[S]tate laws
that intrude on the domain of copyright are preempted even if the particular expression is
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dealing with images leads to some disrespect for photography, meaning that
courts fail to grant photography equal dignity with other types of copyrightable works when compared with the depicted person’s rights. The same
trouble with images likely contributes to courts’ difficulty making the rather
evanescent distinction between a claim based on the use of a person’s persona that just happens to be captured in a photo, and a claim based on the
use of the photo of the person. The courts that hold that photo-based right
of publicity claims fall within the subject matter of copyright are more
honest.31
In any event, the remaining 17 U.S.C. § 301 question was whether there
was any extra element to save the claims. The Dryer court looked to the justification for the right of publicity to answer this question, and found no such
extra element. The court reasoned that the purpose of copyright is to
“suppl[y] the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas,”32 while
the purposes of the right of publicity are “the desire to provide incentives to
encourage a person’s productive activities and to protect consumers from
misleading advertising.”33 Because of the state’s consumer protection interests, a right of publicity claim based on use of a copyrighted work in an advertisement could have consumer protection, antideception purposes unrelated
to copyright’s aims. But for noncommercial uses, such a claim “seeks to
subordinate the copyright holder’s right to exploit the value of that work to
the plaintiff’s interest in controlling the work’s dissemination” and thus
attempts to claim “exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright,”
triggering preemption.34
neither copyrighted nor copyrightable.”); Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d
841, 849 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that state protection for uncopyrightable facts such as
baseball scores was preempted).
31 E.g., Maloney v. T3Media, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 3d 1128, 1137–38 (C.D. Cal. 2015)
(“Accepting Plaintiffs’ interpretation [that the right of publicity extended to the sale and
distribution of photos of athletes] without separating the likeness from the work would
impermissibly negate Copyright’s intended preemptive effect. Further, it would destroy
copyright holders’ ability to exercise their exclusive rights under the Copyright Act, effectively giving the subject of every photograph veto power over the artist’s rights under the
Copyright Act and destroying the exclusivity of rights the Copyright Act aims to protect.”);
Milo & Gabby, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 3d 1341, 1350 (W.D. Wash. 2014)
(finding § 301 preemption of right of publicity claim based on reproduction of photos
showing plaintiffs’ children), appeal filed Milo & Gabby LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 161290 (Fed. Cir. Dec 7, 2015).
32 Dryer v. Nat’l Football League, 814 F.3d 938, 942–43 (8th Cir. 2016) (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., Inc., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)).
33 Id. at 943 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg. Inc.
v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 824, reh’g en banc denied (8th
Cir. 2007)).
34 Id. at 943 (quoting Nat’l Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 991 F.2d
426, 428 (8th Cir. 1993)). Professor McCarthy has also advocated using § 301 preemption
to make an advertising/nonadvertising distinction. 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF
PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 11:55, at 817 (2d ed. 2008) (suggesting that preemption is appro-
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Unpacking the reasoning a bit, the “productive activities” incentivized by
the right of publicity are not exactly the same as “ideas,”35 but—especially in
the modern economy—productive activities are often memorialized in creative works, and the value of celebrities’ productive activities is often derived
from monetizing creative works.36 Thus there is so much overlap between
incentivizing the creation of new works and incentivizing celebrity-generating
productive activities that they should be treated the same for preemption
purposes.37 Without an element of consumer deception in a commercial
context, then, there was nothing “extra” distinguishing the right of publicity
from copyright.
The Dryer court’s reasoning strongly implies that not all advertising uses
should be within the right of publicity either. Not all commercial or advertising uses will involve an element of deception. “Madonna has never had one
of our bananas, but we think she’d like them if she did” is not likely to create
priate when a defendant “reproduces a recorded performance in an expressive, non-advertising medium”). Several other circuits have also endorsed a commercial advertising/
ordinary exploitation distinction. See Facenda v. NFL Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1029 (3d
Cir. 2008) (“The rationale is that state law has a role in regulating practices of trade,
including advertising. But limiting the way that material can be used in expressive works
extends beyond the purview of state law and into the domain of copyright law.”); Laws v.
Sony Music Entm’t, 448 F.3d 1134, 1141 (9th Cir. 2006) (preemption analysis ought to
differentiate between uses to advertise something else and use of a work itself); see also 1
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][l] (rev.
ed. 2015) (surveying relevant caselaw and finding a general divide between uses that are
simply exploitations of the copyrighted work and uses of the copyrighted work to sell some
other product).
35 In the standard account, copyright is supposed to incentivize expression, since copyright doesn’t provide exclusive rights over ideas, but ideas may be thrown off as a side
effect.
36 Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 973 (10th Cir.
1996) (“The principal economic argument made in support of the right of publicity is that
it provides an incentive for creativity and achievement. Under this view, publicity rights
induce people to expend the time, effort, and resources to develop the talents prerequisite
to public recognition. While those talents provide immediate benefit to those with commercially valuable identities, the products of their enterprise—such as movies, songs, and
sporting events—ultimately benefit society as a whole.” (citations omitted)).
37 For example, the players in Dryer were paid for playing in the recorded football
games; the amount they could command clearly related to the television market for the
games. See also C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., 505 F.3d at 824 (rejecting right of publicity claims
by Major League Baseball players and noting that the players “are rewarded, and handsomely, too, for their participation in games and can earn additional large sums from
endorsements and sponsorship arrangements”); Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 973 (“Most sports
and entertainment celebrities with commercially valuable identities engage in activities
that themselves generate a significant amount of income; the commercial value of their
identities is merely a by-product of their performance values.”); id. at 974 (“Moreover, the
additional inducement for achievement produced by publicity rights are often inconsequential because most celebrities with valuable commercial identities are already handsomely compensated.”).
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a false endorsement.38 Nor is a truthful report about or image of President
Obama wearing an advertiser’s jacket on a trip to the Great Wall of China.39
Moreover, the Dryer court drew a commercial speech/noncommercial speech
line for preemption without acknowledging that the trademark law analogue—a false endorsement claim—could also be applied to “noncommercial” speech such as the NFL films. The reason that false endorsement claims
based on noncommercial speech generally fail is that trademark doctrine
itself has developed special First Amendment-influenced treatment for noncommercial speech, so that the usual “likelihood of confusion” test doesn’t
apply to uses of trademarks in films, songs, and the like.40
Courts, that is, do recognize that deception about endorsement is possible in otherwise noncommercial speech. For example, it is possible that a
biography could be falsely labeled as an authorized biography, which might
affect consumers’ purchasing decisions. But the risks of overclaiming by
plaintiffs seeking to suppress truthful mentions of them—such as a plaintiff
claiming that consumers will assume that an ordinary biography has or
requires her permission—are so great that we do not allow plaintiffs to try to
prove actionable endorsement confusion unless the false endorsement is
explicit. This rule denies plaintiffs in noncommercial speech cases access to
the circumstantial evidence on which plaintiffs bringing false endorsement
or affiliation confusion theories can rely in cases involving ordinary consumer products. Trademark has therefore set up a mostly impermeable
boundary between noncommercial speech and endorsement liability.
Thus, if it is the purpose of avoiding false endorsement that distinguishes the right of publicity from copyright law, then the commercial/noncommercial line is only a proxy for actions that further that purpose, and not
always a good one. Claims truly based on false endorsement are the ones
that should survive preemption; a purposive approach could help give meaning both to the “right equivalent to copyright” and to the “extra element” in
§ 301 preemption, as the Dryer court’s reasoning indicates. Such treatment
would also explain what the “extra element” in a right of publicity claim actually is. By contrast, requiring merely that the challenged speech be commercial, like requiring intentional copying, merely shrinks the set of instances in
which the overlapping right applies, rather than adding an extra element
that goes beyond the prerequisites for a copyright infringement claim and
thus avoids preemption.
38 See Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 968 (“If [the hypothetical company] Mitchell Fruit posted a
billboard featuring a picture of Madonna and the phrase, ‘Madonna may have ten platinum albums, but she’s never had a Mitchell banana,’ Madonna would not have a claim for
false endorsement. She would, however, have a publicity rights claim, because Mitchell
Fruit misappropriated her name and likeness for commercial purposes.”).
39 See Stephanie Clifford, Coat Maker Transforms Obama Photo into Ad, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
6, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/07/business/media/07garment.html.
40 See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that use of a mark
in an expressive work is insulated from liability unless the use has “no artistic relevance to
the underlying work whatsoever, or, if it has some artistic relevance, unless the [use]
explicitly misleads as to the source or the content of the work” (footnote omitted)).
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While cases finding copyright preemption of the right of publicity can
be explained based on § 301 because the elements of § 301 preemption are
so fuzzy, the separate concept of conflict preemption can also help understand the right of publicity/copyright boundary.41 Conflict preemption
occurs when a state law obstructs a federal statute’s aims, and can exist even
when a statute also has an explicit preemption provision, as the Copyright
Act does.42 Conflict preemption is often appropriate where states’ rights are
asserted in the context of works that fall within the general scope of copyright or patent law, regardless of whether the material claimed would be
copyrightable or patentable.43 The Supreme Court has, in its more recent
conflict preemption cases, taken a purposive approach similar to that of the
Eighth Circuit in Dryer: states can pursue consumer protection objectives, but
they cannot seek to encourage production directly by granting monopoly
rights over federally unprotected subject matter.44
Most saliently, in Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, the Court expressed
its concern that “through the creation of patent-like rights, the States could
essentially redirect inventive efforts away from the careful criteria of patentability developed by Congress over the last 200 years.”45 Although a right
focused on consumer protection would not be preempted, a pure anticopying right dealt with “the protection of producers as an incentive to product
innovation,” which is only the appropriate role of federal policy.46 The
Court identified incentivizing creation as the state’s (unacceptable) goal in
41 See Rebecca Tushnet, A Mask That Eats into the Face: Images and the Right of Publicity,
38 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 157, 194–95 (2015); cf. Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 448 F.3d
1134, 1145 (9th Cir. 2006) (“We sense that, left to creative legal arguments, the developing
right of publicity could easily supplant the copyright scheme. This, Congress has expressly
precluded in § 301. Were we to conclude that [plaintiff’s] voice misappropriation claim
was not preempted by the Copyright Act, then virtually every use of a copyrighted sound
recording would infringe upon the original performer’s right of publicity. . . . It is hard to
imagine how a copyright would remain meaningful if its licensees were potentially subject
to suit from any performer anytime the copyrighted material was used.”). At a minimum,
to the extent that the “subject matter” and “extra element” inquiries of § 301 are ambiguous, conflict preemption considerations favor reading them to preempt right of publicity
claims against nonadvertising uses of copyrighted works.
42 See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 867 (2000).
43 See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231–32 (1964) (“To allow a
State by use of its law of unfair competition to prevent the copying of an article which
represents too slight an advance to be patented would be to permit the State to block off
from the public something which federal law has said belongs to the public.”); Compco
Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237–38 (1964) (same).
44 See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 156–57 (1989); see
also Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 487 (1974) (finding no conflict
between state trade secret law and patent law where the type of conduct targeted was substantially different and the law protected an interest in privacy, even if trade secret protection also had incentive effects).
45 Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 157.
46 Id.
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creating anticopying rules for boat hulls in Bonito Boats.47 The state didn’t
apply the same constraints on protection as patent law’s high innovation standard, and that ease of access to the state right was a problem that created
interference with the federal scheme and its more targeted incentives.48
With unpreempted state protection for trade secrets, by contrast, the Court
explained that “the state restrictions on the use of unpatented ideas were
limited to those necessary to promote goals outside the contemplation of the
federal patent scheme.”49
In the context of creative works depicting public events, the justification
for the right of publicity is fundamentally the same as that of the copyright
law: to incentivize production of creative performances.50 Conflict preemption means that the efficacy or lack thereof of this proposed incentive is irrelevant, because providing incentives of this sort is a power reserved to the
federal government. In this way, the right of publicity differs from other,
nonpreempted causes of action such as trademark, defamation, and invasion
of privacy—and, under the purposive approach, a right of publicity that furthers the protection of consumers, reputation, or privacy would not be preempted, but would be subject to relevant First Amendment constraints on
the protection of those interests.
B.

The Role of Consent

All of this discussion assumes that the person depicted in a copyrighted
work consented to the work’s creation, which may not be true of caricature,
biography, paparazzi photos, or works that use a person’s name. Because
preemption only makes sense for works in which the depicted person con47 Id. at 158.
48 Id.; see also id. at 159–60 (“We think it clear that such protection conflicts with the
federal policy ‘that all ideas in general circulation be dedicated to the common good
unless they are protected by a valid patent.’” (quoting Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653,
668 (1969))); id. at 164–65 (“The States are simply not free in this regard to offer
equivalent protections to ideas which Congress has determined should belong to all.”).
49 Id. at 166. In the same sentence, the Court does say that “state protection was not
aimed exclusively at the promotion of invention itself,” possibly suggesting that the right of
publicity can aim to incentivize creation as long as it also has other aims, but that interpretation of “exclusively” seems inconsistent with the rest of the Court’s reasoning, given that
the Court goes on to conclude that what was acceptable were rules “limited to those necessary” to promote nonincentive objectives. Id. That is, incentives might also be a side effect
of the state-law right, but they could not on their own justify any increment of protection
that would not be justified by other goals, such as prevention of consumer deception.
50 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977) (“[T]he protection [afforded by a right to control the broadcast of an entire act] provides an economic
incentive for [the performer] to make the investment required to produce a performance
of interest to the public. This same consideration underlies the patent and copyright
laws . . . .”); see also C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc., v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media,
L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 824 (8th Cir. 2007) (stating that publicity rights are intended “to provide incentives to encourage a person’s productive activities and to protect consumers
from misleading advertising”); Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1145 (9th
Cir. 2006) (recognizing the similarity).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-4\NDL405.txt

2017]

unknown

Seq: 11

raising walls against overlapping rights

2-MAY-17

15:11

1549

sented to appear, it can’t play the primary role in limiting the right of
publicity.
However, consent will often protect copyright owners’ rights to exploit
their works. For example, by playing in football games with the certain
knowledge that they were being filmed by NFL Films, the players in Dryer
consented to the creation of copyrighted works—films of football games—
embodying their contributions.51 This consent suffices to justify copyright
preemption.52 The football players’ consent to appear in the work need not
be valid for purposes of applying state publicity law, because the issue is
whether there was consent for federal copyright purposes: consent to appear
in the copyrighted video in which their appearances were fixed. That consent exists regardless of how one thinks about the question of whether the
players count as “authors” for purposes of copyright’s authorship
requirement.53
Would the same copyright preemption rationale apply to cases such as
Wendt, in which the claim was that a copyright owner violated actors’ rights of
publicity by creating animatronic robot versions of them as part of a derivative work based on the TV show in which they appeared?54 The answer
should be yes, though the Ninth Circuit found that the actors had a valid
claim.55 The actors need not consent to the creation of the derivative works;
they consented to the creation of the underlying copyrighted work without
putting conditions on the consent limiting the copyright owner’s right to
exploit that work. Because the copyright owner has the right to make derivative works, any incentive-based theories need to respect Congress’s intent to
give copyright owners incentives to make or authorize derivative works. Only
a right of publicity based on some other theory, such as false endorsement in
the case of advertising uses, should survive preemption.
51 Dryer v. Nat’l Football League, 55 F. Supp. 3d. 1181, 1200 (D. Minn. 2014); see also
Balt. Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663, 675–76, 675 n.22
(7th Cir. 1986) (finding preemption in similar circumstances).
52 Professor Jennifer Rothman has argued that, for similar reasons, conflict preemption of the right of publicity should occur whenever a person consented to appear in a
copyrighted work, including when the work is subsequently used as part of an advertisement. See Rothman, supra note 24, at 254; see also Cotter & Dmitrieva, supra note 24, at 215
(arguing for conflict preemption of right of publicity claims in cases involving noncommercial speech, absent specific exceptions).
53 Cf. Jules Jordan Video, Inc. v. 144942 Can. Inc., 617 F.3d 1146, 1155 (9th Cir. 2010)
(finding preemption when a movie actor alleged that his name and likeness appeared in
counterfeit films, because “[t]he essence of [the actor]’s claim is that the . . . defendants
reproduced and distributed the [films] without authorization,” not that the original copyrighted film had been made without the actor’s knowing participation); Nat’l Basketball
Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 847 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that “Congress specifically
had sporting events in mind” when it drafted the fixation provision and finding that fixation merged the performance with the fixed work for preemption purposes).
54 Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 809 (9th Cir. 1997), reh’g denied 197 F.3d
1284 (9th Cir. 1999).
55 Id. at 814–15.
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What about people who didn’t consent to be evoked or depicted? For
the other torts with justifications that overlap with those of the right of publicity, a person need not consent to be depicted or evoked in most cases of
truthful speech. This rule is subject only to the outer limits where the manipulation of the truth conveys a misleading impression (a cause of action
known as false light56) or invades the person’s privacy with insufficient public
interest justification (which would be very hard to establish where the depiction is based on public events). Just as with consent-based works, false
endorsement might sometimes be an appropriate theory—it is a better fit for
ads than false light, though the basic idea is the same.
Nonetheless, people depicted without their consent may have broader
right of publicity claims and can take advantage of the incentive theories
underlying copyright. The key Supreme Court case that launched the expansion of the right of publicity, Zacchini, was functionally a common-law copyright case involving a performance fixed without the performer’s consent by
a TV news crew.57 Zacchini was decided in 1977, before the current Copyright Act became effective (January 1, 1978). The 1976 Copyright Act, unlike
its predecessors, protects expressive works as soon they are fixed in a tangible
medium, not when they are published; state-common-law copyright is preempted except insofar as it covers unfixed works.58 While that change would
affect some right of publicity claims, Zacchini’s claim, founded on a live performance that was not fixed with his consent, would still be outside the scope
of the modern Copyright Act and thus his claim would remain nonpreempted if brought today.
Understanding the consent cases in terms of copyright preemption also
helps us understand the proper scope of nonconsent cases, insofar as the
appropriate reach of the right of publicity approved by Zacchini corresponds
to the scope of common-law copyright and its incentive and privacy protec56 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
57 See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977) (“[T]he State’s
interest [in permitting a right of publicity] is closely analogous to the goals of patent and
copyright law . . . .”); id. at 575 (“The Constitution no more prevents a State from requiring
respondent to compensate petitioner for broadcasting his act on television than it would
privilege respondent to film and broadcast a copyrighted dramatic work without liability to
the copyright owner . . . .”); id. at 576 (stating that “[t]his same consideration underlies the
patent and copyright laws long enforced by this Court”); MCCARTHY, supra note 34, at 819
(“The proper category for Zacchini’s claim was the state law of common law copyright, not
the right of publicity.” (footnote omitted)); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the
Right of Publicity Can Learn From Trademark Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1187 (2006) (same);
Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent,
and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1365 n.97 (1989) (same); Diane Leenheer
Zimmerman, Who Put the Right in the Right of Publicity?, 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 35,
49–50, 50 n.43 (1998) (same); cf. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d
797, 806 (Cal. 2001) (“Zacchini was not an ordinary right of publicity case: the defendant
television station had appropriated the plaintiff’s entire act, a species of common law copyright violation.”).
58 See Lapham v. Porach, No. 06-Civ-6861, 2007 WL 1224924 at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25,
2007).
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tion justifications.59 The expansion of the right of publicity far beyond the
claim of copying of an entire performance also goes far beyond those legitimate boundaries. Consent to appear in a work without reserving rights to
approve subsequent uses of the work should regularly trigger copyright preemption; lack of consent should provide rights where common-law copyright
would do so to preserve the depicted person’s incentives to create and her
right to wait until a work is finished before sharing it. But those rights should
not extend beyond those performance-incentivizing boundaries unless the
right serves some other specific objective compatible with the First Amendment, such as consumer protection against false endorsement. Otherwise we
are left only with a person’s right to control any discussion about herself, a
right unable to distinguish an unauthorized biography or roman à clef from
an unauthorized video game with any coherence.
III. FIRST AMENDMENT LESSONS FROM PREEMPTION
A.

The Utility of a Purposive Approach

Although the purposive approach is most visible in preemption cases,
the Eighth Circuit took a purposive approach in its First Amendment analysis
in C.B.C. Distribution & Marketing, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced
Media, L.P.,60 a case involving the claim that for-profit fantasy baseball
leagues infringed baseball players’ Missouri rights of publicity by using their
names and other identifying data as part of the games. The Eighth Circuit
reasoned that the players had stated a claim for infringement of their rights
of publicity, as understood by state law, even though “CBC’s use does not fit
neatly into the more traditional categories of commercial advantage, namely,
using individuals’ names for advertising and merchandising purposes in a
way that states or intimates that the individuals are endorsing a product.”61
However, Missouri law didn’t require false endorsement for a right of publicity claim, merely that the defendant have an intent or purpose to benefit
commercially from the use of a person’s identity.62
Nonetheless, the First Amendment overrode the state-law claim under
these circumstances. The court of appeals began with the proposition that
“the information used in CBC’s fantasy baseball games is all readily available
in the public domain, and it would be strange law that a person would not
have a first amendment right to use information that is available to every59 See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 973 (10th
Cir. 1996) (“Zacchini . . . complained of the appropriation of the economic value of his
performance, not the economic value of his identity. The Court’s incentive rationale is obviously more compelling in a right of performance case than in a more typical right of publicity case involving the appropriation of a celebrity’s identity.” (citing RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1995))).
60 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007).
61 Id. at 822.
62 Id.
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one.”63 Moreover, the Court of Appeals pointed out, “[T]he facts in this case
barely, if at all, implicate the interests that states typically intend to vindicate
by providing rights of publicity to individuals.”64 The court pointed to an
individual’s right to reap where she sowed and earn a living, incentives to
engage in productive activities, and protection from misleading advertising,
but noted that none of these were seriously implicated by use of truthful data
about well-paid baseball players.65
As for nonmonetary interests, such as “protecting natural rights,
rewarding celebrity labors, and avoiding emotional harm,” they also weren’t
relevant where the data depended on an already-compensated player’s actual
performance; in addition, “some courts have indicated that the right of publicity is intended to promote only economic interests and that noneconomic
interests are more directly served by so-called rights of privacy,” and the court
endorsed an approach that limited the right of publicity to protection of economic interests.66 (Another way to say this might be to say that any right of
publicity based on moral rights should be subject to the same First Amendment constraints as a right of privacy based on moral rights, a treatment that
clearly excludes the data on baseball players’ public performances from the
players’ control.) The error in the C.B.C. court’s reasoning was in its framing
of these questions as matters of case-by-case balancing, rather than more categorical balancing based on the commercial or noncommercial status of the
speech being challenged.67
Similarly, when the Tenth Circuit decided a case involving baseball cards
using parody names, images, and facts about baseball players, the court chose
the approach of balancing the interests protected by the right against the
First Amendment.68 However, the Tenth Circuit spoke more generally about
63 Id. at 823.
64 Id. at 824.
65 Id.
66 Id. (citation omitted). California’s test, while deeply problematic as applied to
artworks, also at least recognizes that, as an economic right, the right of publicity is not
appropriately used against criticism:
[T]he right of publicity cannot, consistent with the First Amendment, be a right
to control the celebrity’s image by censoring disagreeable portrayals. Once the
celebrity thrusts himself or herself forward into the limelight, the First Amendment dictates that the right to comment on, parody, lampoon, and make other
expressive uses of the celebrity image must be given broad scope. The necessary
implication of this observation is that the right of publicity is essentially an economic right. What the right of publicity holder possesses is not a right of censorship, but a right to prevent others from misappropriating the economic value
generated by the celebrity’s fame . . . .
Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 807 (Cal. 2001).
67 Melville B. Nimmer, The Right to Speak From Times to Time: First Amendment Theory
Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 935, 942–43 (1968) (explaining
the benefits of categorical balancing).
68 Cardtoons v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 972–73 (10th Cir.
1996). In Cardtoons, the Tenth Circuit also mentioned a congestion, tragedy-of-the-commons argument: celebrities should get to control their images to avoid overexposure,
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the effect of parodies on the relevant interests, rather than relying on the
value of the particular parody before it.69 A purposive approach need not
redo balancing anew in each individual case. It can identify, for example,
whether a particular right of publicity claim against an ad involves a false
endorsement. If it does, then real confusion over endorsement in the context of commercial speech should avoid First Amendment problems.70 Catewhich will ultimately destroy the value of a celebrity’s image. Id. at 974–75. This is essentially a dilution rationale; as the Cardtoons court noted, the theory is only acceptable, if at
all, in the context of commercial advertising. See id. at 975. Perhaps more importantly, the
theory doesn’t seem to have any basis in reality; the empirical evidence for dilution—especially dilution via overexposure—is simply lacking. Studies of supposedly dilutive uses do
not show any effect on well-known trademarks. Paul J. Heald & Robert Brauneis, The Myth
of Buick Aspirin: An Empirical Study of Trademark Dilution by Product and Trade Names, 32
CARDOZO L. REV. 2533 (2011). Studies of uses of works in the public domain likewise don’t
show an overexposure effect. Christopher Buccafusco & Paul J. Heald, Do Bad Things Happen When Works Enter the Public Domain?: Empirical Tests of Copyright Term Extension, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1 (2013); Paul J. Heald, Does the Song Remain the Same? An Empirical Study of
Bestselling Musical Compositions (1913–1932) and Their Use in Cinema (1968–2007), 60 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 1 (2009); Paul J. Heald, Does the Song Remain the Same? An Empirical Study of
Bestselling Musical Compositions (1913–1932) and Their Use in Cinema (1968–2007), 60 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 1 (2009); Paul J. Heald, Property Rights and the Efficient Exploitation of Copyrighted Works: An Empirical Analysis of Public Domain and Copyrighted Fiction Bestsellers, 92
MINN. L. REV. 1031 (2008). Overexposure hasn’t hurt the communicative value of the
American flag or countless other symbols. Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 146 n.63 (2004) (“Where a work is truly
iconic, even repeated debasement is unlikely to affect public perceptions. . . . [T]he Statue
of Liberty, the Mona Lisa, Mount Rushmore, and the Eiffel Tower retain their iconic status
despite repeated uses and abuses in many different contexts. So too do the works of
Shakespeare and the characters Frankenstein (and his monster), Dracula, Scrooge, Uncle
Sam, and King Arthur.” (citation omitted)); see also Christo Boshoff, The Lady Doth Protest
Too Much: A Neurophysiological Perspective on Brand Tarnishment, 25 J. PROD. & BRAND MGMT.
196 (2016) (finding no empirical basis for tarnishment); Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty
Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507 (2008) (attacking the
empirical basis for dilution and analyzing dilution as unconstitutional commercial speech
regulation).
69 The Cardtoons court did emphasize that the players at issue were already well compensated, suggesting that its analysis could have differed were the players some other type
of public figure, such as comparatively less well-paid politicians or professors whose activities make the news. Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 974. This, I think, was a mistake, given that
parody is likely to have the same effect on the incentives of anyone, even if they are not
well compensated by other means, and given the First Amendment value of allowing parody and the unlikelihood that victims will regularly authorize parodists. See id. (“Since
celebrities will seldom give permission for their identities to be parodied, granting them
control over the parodic use of their identities would not directly provide them with any
additional income. It would, instead, only allow them to shield themselves from ridicule
and criticism.”).
70 In general, I argue for a materiality requirement in false advertising and trademark
claims. Rebecca Tushnet, Running the Gamut From A to B: Federal Trademark and False Advertising Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1305 (2011). However, the FTC presumes that endorsements
are material in that they are likely to affect consumers’ purchasing decisions, whether or
not consumers should be guided by celebrity opinions, and this seems to me to be a consti-
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gorical approaches need not engage in the dangerous and artistically difficult
task of judging the merits of an individual work against which the right of
publicity is asserted. Doctrines such as trademark law’s Rogers v. Grimaldi test,
which protect artistic uses against infringement liability unless the speaker is
explicitly misleading about the claimant’s endorsement or affiliation, simplify
the inquiry, which itself has a speech-protective effect by making clear when
claimants should not bother to sue.71
B.

The Insufficiency of Borrowing “Transformativeness” From Copyright

Why not instead borrow the concept of fair use from copyright? One
could argue that copyright’s First Amendment safeguards are as relevant to
an incentive-based right of publicity as the First Amendment tests I’ve advocated borrowing from trademark and defamation.72 I disagree, for several
reasons related to the different purposes served by copyright and many right
of publicity claims.
First, copyright’s preemption principles mean that, where incentives are
at issue, copyright preemption will often preclude a right of publicity claim
regardless of the First Amendment. To the extent that the right of publicity
covers unauthorized copying of unfixed performances and serves to protect
incentives in that limited, unpreempted circumstance, as in Zacchini, then a
fair-use-style defense might well be appropriate. However, copyright fair use
is a poor fit as a major limitation on other acts alleged to violate the right of
publicity—and this poor fit makes sense once we start thinking about the
right of publicity in purposive ways.
Second and relatedly, copyright fair use identifies situations where the
incentives of other creators would be harmed too much or where copyright
owners would not be relevantly incentivized by extending the copyright
owner’s control over a subsequent use. Where the primary considerations
involve false association or reputational interests, copyright fair use isn’t configured to identify situations where those interests aren’t enough to justify
liability.
Third, the Supreme Court has clearly indicated that it is not just fair use
that makes copyright law tolerable under the First Amendment. The idea/
expression distinction and the lack of protection for facts also limit copyright; the free speech implications of control over ideas or facts would be too
great to be borne. Thus, a right of publicity defense that only borrowed fair
use and not the lack of protection for ideas and facts would not have the full
tutionally permissible approach. 16 C.F.R. § 255.1(b) (2009). In addition, if an ad causes
confusion about whether a celebrity endorses a particular product, the celebrity’s dignity
interest in avoiding a false association—an interest that is possessed by humans but not by
trademarks—probably should be given greater weight than the mere mention or reference
that defies the celebrity’s desire to control all commercial uses of her identity.
71 William McGeveran, The Trademark Fair Use Reform Act, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2267, 2289,
2313 (2010).
72 See Pamela Samuelson, Reviving Zacchini: Analyzing First Amendment Defenses in Right
of Publicity and Copyright Cases, 57 TUL. L. REV. 836, 837 (1983).
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range of First Amendment safeguards that copyright does. Information identifying celebrities is usually factual—appropriating celebrity identity generally
requires reproducing attributes that the celebrities actually have.73 In some
cases, such as White v. Samsung74 (where the defendant made an ad with a
robot in a blonde wig that evoked Vanna White) or Geller v. Fallon McElligott
Advertising75 (where the defendant’s ad featured a person who could bend
spoons, a trick that was allegedly uniquely associated with Uri Geller), one
might argue that what is copied is not facts as such but a more free-floating
“persona”—but “persona” in that sense sounds a lot like a style, which is generally considered to be an unprotectable idea. So, if we truly borrowed copyright principles to limit the right of publicity, it might well be narrowed to
the point of nonexistence.76
Copyright’s lack of protection for facts and ideas also helps explain
another problem with borrowing fair use for the right of publicity. As Mark
McKenna has cogently argued, a fair-use defense requires the comparison of
one work with another, to see if the defendant’s work transforms the plaintiff’s work by providing a new meaning or message.77 But this comparison
requires two works, whereas a right of publicity claim involves a person and a
work, and it’s just not clear how to identify when the transition from one to
the other is “transformative.” Especially given that the elements of the person’s identity that are taken in the allegedly infringing work will usually be
facts or ideas, fair use’s idea of transformation—which is focused on the
expressive, protectable elements of a work—lacks any real purchase on the
plaintiff’s identity. This incommensurability contributes to the deep incoherence in the caselaw: courts can’t decide whether it’s the overall accused work
that should be transformative or the specific depiction of the plaintiff within
the work.
73 See C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505
F.3d 818, 823 (8th Cir. 2007).
74 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993).
75 No. 90 Civ. 2839, 1991 WL 640574 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 1991).
76 For example, copyright does not ever protect facts, so using copyright limitations
would mean that facts about a celebrity could be used without hindrance in ads, even if, as
some courts have speculated, the appearance of a celebrity in an ad—or even a celebrity’s
name—implies endorsement. See Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 413
(9th Cir. 1996) (“[U]se of celebrity endorsements in television commercials is so well
established by commercial custom that a jury might find an implied endorsement in General Motors’ use of the celebrity’s name in a commercial . . . .”); Allen v. Nat’l Video, Inc.,
610 F. Supp. 612, 627 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (“When a public figure of Woody Allen’s stature
appears in an advertisement, his mere presence is inescapably to be interpreted as an
endorsement.”).
77 Mark P. McKenna & Shelby Niemann, 2016 Trademark Year in Review 35 (Feb. 5,
2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2886627. There are also a series of purpose-transformation copyright cases where a pure
copy of the plaintiff’s work is nonetheless fair because the purpose of the defendant’s use
is completely different from the plaintiff’s, as when a search engine copies webpages in
order to index the Internet rather than to communicate the expressive message of any
particular webpage. But the problem of fit is basically the same.
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Finally, these problems of theory have been borne out in practice: a
number of courts have adopted a version of copyright fair use to provide First
Amendment limits on the right of publicity, and it’s been a disaster. Courts
have attempted to simplify the test by asking only whether the defendant’s
use is transformative, and not addressing the other usual considerations.
Asking how factual or creative the plaintiff’s identity is—factor two of the
copyright fair-use test—and asking what effect the defendant’s use would
have on the market for the “original” or its authorized derivatives—factor
four—are so obviously nonsensical or at best circular that they make the conceptual mismatch far too clear, while asking “how much” of a celebrity identity was taken—factor three—seems metaphysical at best.
Even with this simplification, copyright transformativeness doesn’t work
for the right of publicity. Numerous scholars, myself among them, have
made the case against transformativeness as a right of publicity defense.78
Our objections cluster around two problems. First, because it is hard to figure out what it means for a work to “transform” a persona, the standard leads
to unpredictable results with chilling effects on speech.79 Second, the transformativeness standard leads to the conclusion that realistic depictions of a
celebrity are infringing, but that implies that news stories and photographs—
78 See, e.g., Stacey Dogan, Bullying and Opportunism in Trademark and Right-of-Publicity
Law, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1293, 1309–10 (2016); David Franklyn & Adam Kuhn, Owning Oneself
in a World of Others: Towards a Paid-For First Amendment, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 977 (2014);
Tushnet, supra note 41; Thomas E. Kadri, Comment, Fumbling the First Amendment: The
Right of Publicity Goes 2–0 Against Freedom of Expression, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1519 (2014); Geoffrey F. Palachuk, Note, Transformative Use Test Cannot Keep Pace with Evolving Arts: The Failings of the Third and Ninth Circuit “Transformative Use” Tests at the Intersection of the Right of
Publicity and the First Amendment, 16 U. DENV. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 233 (2014).
79 See, e.g., Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 165–66 (3d Cir. 2013) (majority and
dissent disagreeing about whether the depiction of a football player in the context of
made-up football games was transformative); ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915,
936–37 (6th Cir. 2003) (majority and dissent disagreeing about the value of what painterdefendant contributed to painting); Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 476 (Cal. 2003)
(reversing the Court of Appeals’s finding of nontransformativeness); Daniel v. Wayans, 213
Cal. Rptr. 3d 865 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2017) (majority and dissent disagreeing about
whether the juxtaposition of a photo with a cartoon was transformative); Tushnet, supra
note 41, at 170–78 (discussing inconsistencies inherent in transformativeness applied to
the right of publicity). Compare In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing
Litig., 724 F.3d 1268, 1271 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that use of athletes’ likenesses in a
fantasy video game was not “transformative”), and Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894,
911 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that the use of Paris Hilton’s face superimposed over a cartoon body in a greeting card parody of the television show The Simple Life was not transformative because “the basic setting is the same” as in the show), with Hoffman v. Capital
Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1184 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that a magazine’s use of
an image of Dustin Hoffman from the movie Tootsie was transformative because “Hoffman’s body was eliminated and a new, differently clothed body was substituted in its
place”), and Noriega v. Activision/Blizzard, Inc., No. BC551747, 2014 WL 5930149, at *5
(Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 27, 2014) (finding that use of Manuel Noriega’s likeness in Call of
Duty: Black Ops II was transformative because the game as a whole, not the use itself, was
transformative).
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at the core of protected noncommercial speech—should be considered
infringing, and courts have simply dealt with the problem by unconvincing
fiat, distinguishing some kinds of realism from others.80
IV. FURTHER DIRECTIONS IN DEFENDING
THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY

AND

LIMITING

It’s also possible to defend the right of publicity as protecting a celebrity’s interest in the integrity of her personhood or her privacy. These interests are not the same as either incentives for production or false
endorsement. However, here too there is already extensive precedent about
these moral justifications and their very limited force with respect to truthful
information; the First Amendment itself precludes most rights based purely
on personhood claims.81 Facts can’t be owned, broadly speaking.82 When
an organization “lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance[,] then state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need to further a state interest of the
highest order.”83 A personhood-based right of publicity thus would be very
far from a right to control public discourse about truthful, nondefamatory
information.84
There is also a line of argument condemning appropriation of a person’s image, and the labor expended to create that image, for another’s benefit. In order to justify a right of publicity based on an anti-free-riding or
misappropriation principle, however, we would need a clear understanding
of what is wrong with free riding, especially in the context of noncommercial
speech. We would also need some explanation of why an entity that creates a
video game or a painting or even a funny ad is free riding in terms of labor,
even if the subject of the resulting work is of interest to other people because
80 See, e.g., Hart, 717 F.3d at 168; cf. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21
P.3d 797, 811 (Cal. 2001) (opining that, while the lesser-known defendant’s charcoal drawings of the Three Stooges were nontransformative, Andy Warhol’s visual depictions of
celebrities were transformative because Warhol was engaged in commentary on the phenomenon of celebrity).
81 Cf. C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505
F.3d 818, 824 (8th Cir. 2007) (reasoning that celebrities can protect their economic interests by controlling sponsorships and blocking confusing commercial uses, and any
noneconomic interests in controlling truthful reporting about their performances do not
justify suppressing truthful speech).
82 See Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The general rule of law is, that the noblest of human productions—knowledge,
truths ascertained, conceptions, and ideas—become, after voluntary communication to
others, free as the air to common use.”).
83 Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979).
84 Cf. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988) (refusing to allow the
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress to evade the strict requirements of defamation as applied to editorial speech).
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it is about a specific topic or even a single person.85 We are all standing on
the shoulders of giants, but only metaphorically. Without interference with
their physical persons, those giants need an explanation for why we shouldn’t
be able to build on their work. Copyright, defamation, and trademark law all
provide decent answers to that question in at least some instances, but the
right of publicity does not. Or, as the Tenth Circuit put it in Cardtoons,
“[B]lind appeals to first principles carry no weight in our balancing
analysis.”86
CONCLUSION
The First Amendment has a preemptive role to play in setting boundaries for what is capable of reduction to private property in information. However, the caselaw currently allows claimants to evade First Amendment limits
on trademark by switching their claims to the right of publicity, with Viraj as
only one very blatant example. Likewise, some trademark owners now tout
the virtue of copyright protection for logos in order to control uses that
wouldn’t constitute trademark infringement,87 which is especially important
because copyright fair use is not oriented towards the same types of situations
as trademark defenses are.88 Thus, while the First Amendment should contribute to the management of potential intellectual property overlaps, right
now courts are insufficiently attentive to the risks involved in allowing private
85 See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 976 (10th
Cir. 1996) (“As in all celebrity parodies, Cardtoons added a significant creative component
of its own to the celebrity identity and created an entirely new product. Indeed, allowing
[baseball players] to control or profit from the parody trading cards would actually sanction the theft of Cardtoons’ creative enterprise.”).
86 Id. at 975. Similar difficulties attend a labor-desert approach claiming that celebrities have earned the right to appropriate every economic benefit from their celebrity, or an
unjust-enrichment approach making the inverse argument that others have no right to
benefit from the value of the celebrity’s identity. See id. at 975–76. Not only are celebrities
not famous through their efforts alone, but it is generally acceptable for other people to
benefit from the labor of others without paying, as when I appreciate a neighbor’s wellkept garden. See Lemley, supra note 68, at 149.
87 See, e.g., Janet Fries & Kelly Horein, Protect Your Brand Via Copyright, DBRANDING
BLOG (Apr. 4, 2016), http://www.dbrandingblog.com/protect-your-brand-via-copyright/;
Rebecca Tushnet, INTA: Copyright Law for Trademark Lawyers, REBECCA TUSHNET’S 43(B)LOG
(May 9, 2012, 8:54 AM), http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2012/05/inta-copyright-law-fortrademark.html (summarizing a discussion among trademark owner representatives about
how to leverage copyright to obtain additional rights); see also Omega S.A v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 776 F.3d 692, 696 (9th Cir. 2015) (affirming the rejection of an attempt to use
copyright to override first sale rights under trademark). The opposite problem, using
trademark to expand rights not granted by copyright, may also occur, even after Dastar
Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003). See Mary LaFrance, A Material
World: Using Trademark Law to Override Copyright’s First Sale Rule for Imported Copies, 21 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 43, 70–72 (2014).
88 See, e.g., Matthew D. Bunker, Advertising and Appropriation: Copyright and Fair Use in
Advertising, 54 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 167, 168 (2007) (pointing out that “trademark
fair use is quite different conceptually from its copyright cousin” (emphasis omitted)).
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parties their choice of different property-type claims over speech. It is disconcerting, but perhaps unsurprising in our current political context, that
defendants asserting private property rights of their own (copyright) have
done better avoiding incursions by others’ right of publicity claims than
defendants asserting First Amendment rights to speak. A coherent, purposive approach applied both to preemption and to First Amendment defenses
might improve judicial understanding of how the right of publicity allows
celebrities too much control over nondefamatory speech, both commercial
and noncommercial.
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